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Among the many issues that arise in the discussion of optimal monetary arrangements, the avail-
ability ofshort-termcredittothebanking systemintimesofhighliquidity demandstandsoutinour
minds as particularly important. Monetary history is full of instances in which a lack of liquidity
has led to crises and to distortions of real allocations that are believed to have been at least some-
what avoidable.
1 These occurrences suggest that avoiding crises requires the currency supply to be
at least somewhat elastic with respect to currency demand. In most modern economies, the ability
to issue money is granted exclusively to a central bank, and with this comes the responsibility of
adjusting the money supply in response to transitory changes in liquidity demand. This responsi-
bility wasimportant enoughto merit high billing in the act establishing the Federal Reserve System
in the United States, ‘‘An act to provide for the establishment of Federal Reserve Banks, to furnish
an elastic currency, ::: and for other purposes.’’ Similarly, providing liquidity in an effort to avert
crises is typically believed to be a critical function of Banco de México.
2
One way a central bank can make the money supply elastic is through the use of short-term
credit, or discount window lending. In this paper, we focus on whether the interest rate on short-
term credit should be fixed in nominal or in real terms. To address this issue, we draw on the
existing elastic-currency literature. Beginning with Sargent and Wallace [15] , papers including
Champ, Smith, andWilliamson[6], Williamson[18], andFreeman[8], [9] haveemployedformal
economic models to examine the effects of having an elastic currency supply. These papers focus
on stationary equilibria and show how an elastic currency can promote a more efficient allocation
1 See, for instance, the examples described in Freeman [8] and Champ, Smith, and Williamson [6] . Additional
historical information on financial crises can be found in Kindleberger[12] .
2 See, for example, the discussion in O’Dogherty [14] .
1of resources in these equilibria. This provides a rigorous theoretical justification for the claim that
having an elastic currency is important for achieving an efficient allocation of resources. In the
stationary equilibria studied, however, real and nominal interest rates are the same and hence our
issue of interest does not arise. A recent paper by Antinolfi, Huybens, and Keister [2] allows for
nonstationary equilibria and demonstrates that the short-term lending used to make the currency
elastic can be destabilizing in the sense that it can introduce inflationary equilibria.
3 In this paper
andinitspredecessorscitedabove,the(explicitorimplicit)interestrateonshort-termcreditisfixed
at zero, since this rate allows the economy to achieve a Pareto optimal equilibrium allocation. In
the present paper, we generalize the results of Antinolfi, Huybens, and Keister [2] by allowing the
central bank to set arbitrary non-negative interest rates. By allowing short-term credit to be costly,
we make the model applicable to a wider range of economic situations, including dollarization
(which we discuss in detail below). Fixing the interest rate in nominal terms may seem the more
natural approach in this environment, since it generates non-negative revenue for the central bank
regardless of how the price level moves through time. However, we show that this policy can be
destabilizing. Specifically, we show that fixing the nominal interest rate generates inflationary
equilibria regardless of the level at which the rate is set. In contrast, fixing the real interest rate
rules out inflationary equilibria, again regardless of the level at which the rate is set.
The discussion above assumes that the monetary authority has the ability to print currency and
put it into circulation. However, proposals have recently been made in a number of countries,
including Mexico, to either establish a currency board or abolish the national currency altogether
and dollarize. While adopting suchpoliciesmay eliminate the current or potential problemscaused
3 SeealsoSmithandWeber[16] onthisissue,whichshowshowhavinganelasticcurrencygeneratedbyunrestricted
private banknote issue can lead to indeterminacy of equilibrium.
2by speculation against the domestic currency, they severely limit the ability of the central bank
to provide liquidity in times of high demand. Eichengreen [7] cites this as a primary concern
for Mexico, saying that the banking system must be strengthened before dollarization should be
considered, so that it is able to withstand movements in liquidity demand without central bank
intervention. We argue that the model we employ below provides a useful framework for analyzing
these issues. When the central bank cannot print money, the economy loses the ability to provide
short-term credit at a zero (nominal) interest rate. In times of high liquidity demand, however,
the economy will still be able to borrow from abroad at some positive (real) interest rate. This
could be achieved, for example, through the issue of public debt, with the proceeds being lent to
the banking sector (as noted by Calvo [5] , this is how advanced countries typically fund large
lender-of-last-resort operations). We therefore argue that dollarization can be seen as a mechanism
for committing to having an interest rate on short-term credit that is fixed in real terms. Such a
commitment obviously does not come without cost, but our analysis shows that the effect on the
banking sector is not necessarily negative. In particular, the model predicts that liquidity crises
would be less frequent under dollarization. The increased cost of obtaining short-term credit leads
banks to hold ‘‘extra’’ liquidity for insurance purposes, which in turn makes the occurrence of a
liquidity crisis less likely.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the model
that we employ, which is taken from Champ, Smith, and Williamson [6] and Antinolfi, Huybens,
and Keister [2] . We review the physical environment and the behavior of both consumers and
banks. We then analyze the bank’s portfolio allocation problem in a general structure that allows
for both fixed nominal and fixed real interest rates. In section 3, we analyze equilibrium in the
3economy with a fixed nominal interest rate on discount window loans. We show that there exist
inflationary equilibria regardless of the interest rate chosen. In section 4, we turn to equilibrium
in the economy with a fixed real interest rate. We show that in this case there are no inflationary
equilibria, again regardless of the rate chosen. Finally, in section 5 we discuss some implications
of the model for the dollarization debate in Mexico.
2. The Model
In this section we present the Champ, Smith, and Williamson [6] model
4 with the modification
that banks can borrow from the discount window at some interest rate rt: We describe the physical
environment and the solutions to the consumers’ problems. The bulk of the section is devoted to
deriving the solution to the bank’s problem in this environment. These results are then used in the
analysis of equilibrium in the sections that follow.
2.1 The Physical Environment
The economy consists of an infinite sequence of overlapping generations of consumers, each of
which lives for two periods. There is a single, non-storable consumption good in each period. In
each period, a continuum of agents with unit mass is born at each of two identical locations. Half
of these agents have endowments (!1;!2) = (x;0) and are called ‘‘lenders,’’ while the remaining
half have endowments (!1;!2) = (0;y) and are called ‘‘borrowers.’’ All consumers have R2
++ as
their consumption set and have preferences given by u(c1;c2) = ln(c1) + ¯ ln(c2): It is assumed
that y < ¯x holds, which implies that this is a Samuelson-case economy (see Gale [10] ) and hence
there is a role for money as a store of value. At t = 0 there is a continuum of old agents with unit
4 This is actually a simplified version of the model, where seasonal effects have been removed.
4mass in each location, each of whom is endowed with M > 0 units of fiat money.
In addition to the store of value role for money, there is a transactions role for money generated
by spatial separation and limited communication.
5 To simplify matters, we assume that all trans-
actions must be intermediated by a bank.
6 At the beginning of each period, all agents receive their
endowments. At this point, agents (and banks) cannot move between or communicate across loca-
tions, and therefore each agent trades with a bank in her own location. Y oung lenders deposit their
savings in a bank, then young borrowers contact a bank and obtain a loan. The bank also trades
with old agents in order to achieve the desired allocation of cash in its portfolio. At this point, all
agents consume. Next, a fraction ¼t of young lenders in each location is notified that they will be
moved to the other location. Lenders who will be relocated are called ‘‘movers,’’ while the remain-
ing lenders are called ‘‘non-movers.’’ Goods can never be transported between locations. Limited
communication prevents privately-issued liabilities, such as checks, from being verifiable in the
other location. Currency, on the other hand, is universally recognizable and non-counterfeitable,
and is therefore accepted in both locations. Movers are able to contact their bank and withdraw
currency. Immediately afterwards, the movers are relocated and the next period begins. Agents
now receive their old-age endowments, and borrowers use part of this endowment to repay their
loans. With this revenue, banks make repayments to non-movers. Movers use the currency they
received from the bank to buy consumption in their new location, and at this point all old agents
consume and end their lifecycle. Notice that the old-age consumption of a mover will always be
equal to the real value of the money that she takes with her to the new location.
7
5 This is as in Townsend [17] , Mitsui and Watanabe [13] , and Hornstein and Krusell [11] .
6 This strong assumption is not necessary, although some restrictions on who can trade with whom are required. See
the discussion in Champ, Smith, and Williamson [6] .
7 Sincethe consumptionset isR2
++, thiseliminatesby assumptionthenon-monetary equilibrium that typically exists
in overlapping generations models (see, for example, Balasko and Shell [4] ).
5The relocation probability ¼t is a random variable in each period. Since there is a continuum
of lenders, it represents both the probability of relocation for each lender and the fraction of all
lenders who move. That is, ¼t gives the size of the aggregate liquidity shock; high values of ¼t
correspond to high liquidity demand and low values to low liquidity demand. It has support [0;1)
and is drawn from the twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing distribution function F
with associated density function f: It is independently and identically distributed over time.
2.2 Consumers
Borrowers face a gross market interest rate of Rt. They choose their quantity of borrowing `t to
maximize utility, that is, to solve the problem
max
`t
ln(`t) + ¯ ln(y ¡ Rt`t):





Lenders deposit all of their savings in a bank. The return they receive on this saving depends on
both whether or not they move and what fraction of all young lenders move. Specifically, they are
promised a real return rm
t (¼) if they move and rn
t (¼) if they do not move. Lenders then choose
the amount they save dt to maximize expected utility, that is, to solve
max
dt











The solution to this problem sets




6Notice that the amount of saving is independent of the distributionof the rates of return. This result
clearly depends on the assumptions of log utility and no old-age income for lenders, which imply
that the income and substitution effects of a change in the rate of return exactly offset each other.
These assumptions allows us to obtain an explicit expression defining the solution to the bank’s
problem below.
2.3 Banks
Banks serve two important functions in this setup: they provide intermediation between borrowers
and lenders and they provide lenders with insurance against the relocation shock. It is assumed
that banks behave competitively in the sense that they (i) take the real return on assets as given
and (ii) choose the deposit return schedules rm
t (¼) and rn
t (¼) to maximize the expected utility of
young lenders. A young lender deposits her entire savings d with a bank. Per unit of deposits, the
bank acquires an amount °t of real money balances, and makes loans with a real value 1 ¡ °t: In
addition, the bank borrows a non-negative amount ±t from the discount window. The bank faces
two constraints on the return schedules it can offer. First, relocated agents must be given currency,
since that is the only asset which will allow these agents to consume in their new location. This
currency comes from the bank’s reserve holdings and from the discount window. Let ®t(¼) denote
the fraction of the bank’s reserves that are given to movers and pt the general price level at time t.
Then the return to holding money between time t and t + 1 is given by
pt
pt+1 and the constraint
¼r
m







must hold. The second constraint is that payments to non-movers cannot exceed the value of the
bank’s remaining portfolio – remaining reserves plus the returns from the bank’s lending minus the
7repayment of the discount window loan. Since the bank’s loans earn the gross real rate of return
Rt, this constraint can be written as
(1 ¡ ¼)r
n
t (¼) = [1 ¡ ®t(¼)]°t
pt
pt+1




where rt > 0 is the nominal interest rate on discount window loans at time t.
8 In this section we
are only interested in solving the bank’s problem at a point in time, so we can treat the process rt as
being arbitrary. In Section 3, we will assume that rt is constant through time, that is, that the central
bank fixes the nominal interest rate on discount window loans. In Section 4, we will assume that
rt is set by a rule that makes the real interest rate constant through time.
Banksmaximizeatypicalyoung lender’sexpectedutility subject tothese constraints. Given(2),
the bank’s problem is to choose rm
t (¼) and rn



























subject to the constraints (3) and (4), which will hold with equality at an optimum. Substituting in



















0 · °t · 1
0 · ®t(¼) · 1
±t(¼) ¸ 0:
8 If rt were equal to zero, the results in Antinolfi, Huybens, and Keister [2] would apply. That case involves an
indeterminacy in the bank’s borrowing rule which complicates the exposition, and therefore we do not present it here.
Nevertheless, the equilibrium results for that case can be obtained from ours by taking the limit as rt approaches zero.
8Both the fraction of bank reserves paid out to movers ®t and the real amount of borrowing ±t are
chosen after the realization of ¼, while °t, the fraction of reserves in the bank’s asset portfolio, is
chosen before the realization of ¼: Hence we can first solve for the optimal values of ®t and ±t as
functions of ° and ¼: That is, we can choose ®t and ±t to solve the problem
max
®t;±t










0 · ®t · 1
±t ¸ 0:









































































pt+1 + (1 ¡ °t) Rt
1+rt
: (7)
When demand for liquidity is low (the relocation shock is below a critical value ¼¤), the bank is
able to give movers and non-movers the same return by paying out only a fraction of its reserves
to movers. Since the bank wants to provide lenders with insurance against the relocation shock,
this is the optimal thing to do. When the realization of the relocation shock is greater than ¼¤,
9however, this is no longer feasible. In this case, there are so many movers that even if all of the
bank’scashreservesaregiventothem, they willreceivealowerreturnthanthe(relatively few)non-
movers. Following Champ, Smith, and Williamson [6] , we call such an event a liquidity crisis. In
a crisis, the bank has an incentive to borrow currency from the discount window inorder to transfer
resourcesfromnon-moverstomovers. However, such borrowing iscostly and, asaresult, thebank
waits until the number of movers is above a second critical level ¼¤¤ before obtaining a loan from
the discount window.
Some intuition for the range of inaction [¼¤;¼¤¤] can be gained from looking at figure 1: The
horizontal axis measures total resources given to movers, while the vertical axis measures total
resources given to non-movers (both per unit of deposits). The figure presents the bank’s set of
feasible alternatives in this space once °t has been chosen. One action that is always feasible is
to give all cash reserves (which will be worth °t
pt
pt+1 next period) to movers and the returns from
all real lending (worth (1 ¡ °t)Rt) to non-movers. This reference point is labelled on both axes
in the figure. If instead the bank wants to give fewer resources to movers and more to non-movers
(perhaps because there are very few movers this period), it can do so on a one-for-one basis. That
is, for every unit of future consumption (in the form of currency) that is taken away from movers,
exactly one unit is given to non-movers. For this reason, the slope of the boundary is (¡1) above
the reference point. Now suppose that instead the bankwantstogivemore resourcestomoversand
fewer to non-movers. In this case the bank must obtain a loan from the discount window, so that
for every unit of additional consumption given to movers, non-movers must give up (1 + rt) units.
This change in the rates of substitution is what leads to the kink in the constraint set presented in
the figure.
10The solution presented in (5) gives (implicitly) the bank’s optimal choice from this set for each
value of ¼:Whenthereare very fewmovers, theoptimal actionistogivealmost all of theresources
to non-movers and hence choose a point near the vertical axis. As we examine larger and larger
realizations of ¼; the optimal point moves to the southeast along this boundary. That is, as more
lenders are relocated, it is optimal to give more total resources to movers as a group. At ¼ = ¼¤;
the optimal action reaches the kink in the constraint set. This point remains the optimal choice for
a range of values of ¼; only when the realization is greater than ¼¤¤ is it optimal to move to the
steeper-sloped part of the boundary. Hence this kink in the bank’s opportunity set generates the
range of inaction [¼¤;¼¤¤] in the optimal levels of ®t and ±t. In conjunction with equation (7), this
also demonstrates how the interest rate rt determines the potential severity of crises. The more
expensive borrowing is, the larger ¼t must be (and therefore the larger the gap between the returns
of movers and non-movers will be) before a bank resorts to a loan to ease the crisis.
We now proceed to solve for the optimal value of °t: To do so, we substitute the optimal values
of ®t and ±t into the bank’s objective function so that the only remaining variable to be determined






























Because borrowing is costly, the solution to this problem will always be interior. The first-order















pt+1 + (1 ¡ °t) Rt
1+rt












(1 ¡ ¼)f (¼)d¼;






Thisimplicitly definesthe solutiontothe bank’sportfolioallocationproblem(recallthat °t appears
in the expressions for ¼¤ and ¼¤¤ above). In the next two sections we use this solution to study
equilibrium under two different policies: a fixed nominal interest rate and a fixed real interest rate.
3. Fixing the Nominal Interest Rate
We first analyze the regime in which the central bank fixes the interest rate on short-term credit in
nominal terms, that is, sets rt = r for all t. Thispolicy has the nicefeaturethat it isalwaysfeasible;
it requires no real resources from the central bank no matter how the price level changes through
time. If a bank demands a loan of ± (in real terms, per unit of deposits), it goes to the discount
window and receives ±pt pesos. In the following period, the bank must pay back ±pt(1 + r) pesos.
Weassumethatthecentral bankdestroys±pt of thesepesosandusestheremaining ±rpt topurchase
goods. In this way, the stock of currency in circulation remains fixed at M: We assume that agents
derivenoutility fromthe revenueearnedby the central bank. If instead the revenuewererebated to
banks as a state-contingent, lump-sum payment, the qualitative properties of the results would not
change. Such rebates complicate the derivations substantially, so we present the simpler case here.
In addition, having the revenue exit the economy will be the appropriate assumption in Section 5,
12where we apply the model to the issue of dollarization.
The only change tothe analysisof thebank’s problemabove isthat the time subscript is dropped
from interest rate. An equilibrium of this economy is characterized by the market clearing condi-
tions for real balances and loans. Since the supply of real balances is equal to M
pt and the demand







Similarly, the demand for loans is given in (1), while the supply of loans is given by (1 ¡ °t)d:
Together these yield the market clearing condition for loans,
y
(1 + ¯)Rt














We define the parameter Ã to save on notation in what follows. Recall that the assumption that our
economy falls in the Samuelson case implies that Ã is less than unity. Substituting (9) and (10) into

























The following proposition gives the properties of equilibrium that follow from this equation. This
is a generalization of Proposition 2 in Antinolfi, Huybens, and Keister [2] , which covers the case
of r equal to zero.
Proposition 1 Whentheinterestrateondiscountwindowloansisfixedinnominalterms,thereisa
continuum of equilibria. One of these equilibria is stationary, with °t = °¤ for all t, where we have
°¤ 2
h




: All other equilibria exhibit sustained inflation with °t asymptotically
approaching zero.
The proof of Proposition 1 is presented in Appendix A. The graph of the implicit function defined
in (12) is presented in figure 2. The curve crosses the 45-degree line exactly once; this corresponds
to the unique steady-state equilibrium.
The interesting feature of this law of motion is that it generates inflationary equilibria. In these
equilibria, the real value of the stock of base money goes to zero, and therefore bank reserve hold-
ings must also go to zero. Because of the logarithmic preferences and the fact that movers need
money in order to consume, there is a lower bound below which the total real demand for money
(reserves plus short-term credit) in this model never falls. The only way reserve holdings can go
to zero is if they are being replaced by an expanding stock of short-term credit. Hence, inflation
is necessarily accompanied by an expansion of the real value of discount window lending in this
model.
As reserve holdings decrease, real lending increases and therefore the market interest rate Rt




1+r (this follows from (9) and (16)). These two facts combine to show that the
long-run nominal interest rate is given by (1 + r), which is exactly the rate at which the discount
window is lending. The fact that the central bank is lending at the market rate of interest in the
long run is crucial for understanding why inflationary equilibria arise here. In the stationary equi-
librium, the central bank is charging a ‘‘penalty rate’’ at the discount window. The interest rate on
discount window loans is higher than the market rate, so that a bank whose reserve holdings turn
out to be too low (relative to the realization of ¼t) is penalized. This gives banks an incentive to
holdprecautionary reserves, andthereby generatesastrong demandfor money. Thisisinitially true
in an inflationary equilibrium as well. As the inflation rate increases, however, the market nom-
inal interest rate is rising and therefore this penalty is decreasing. As the penalty falls, the strong
incentive for banks to hold reserves falls with it. Asymptotically, banks are indifferent between
holding reserves and borrowing, since the discount window is charging exactly the market rate.
This undermines the strong demand for base money in the model and thereby permits inflation as
an equilibrium outcome.
In the next section, we suppose instead that the interest rate on discount window loans is fixed
in real terms. We show that the structure of the penalty faced by banks when their reserves turn out
to be too low is substantially different in this case, and that for this reason there are no inflationary
equilibria.
4. Fixing the Real Interest Rate
For the interest rate on short-term credit to be fixed in real terms, we must have




15for every t, where r is the (fixed) real interest rate. One canthink of thiscase asbeing implemented
ineither of two ways. The first isstraightforward: the interest rateat the discount windowisposted
inreal termsand isalways equal tor: Another implementation is to post the interest rate in nominal
terms, but adjust it each period so that the implied real rate is always equal to r:
As before, a bank observes the realization of ¼ and determines the real amount ± ¸ 0 that it
would like to borrow . It then obtains ±pt pesos from the discount window, and in the next period
it must return (1 + r)±pt+1 pesos. We again assume that the central bank engages in purchases or
sales of goods so that the stock of money remains unchanged at M. We will show below that in
equilibrium, the central bank will always earn a positive amount of revenue with this policy.
9
In solving the bank’s problem above, we assumed that nominal interest rate rt is positive. In the
present setting, this implies that we must have
pt
pt+1
< 1 + r; (13)
or that the return to holding money is not too high. In other words, the solution to the bank’s
problem given in section 2 does not apply in the face of a very strong deflation. If the inequality in
(13) were reversed, the bank would have to repay fewer pesos than it borrowed. Since pesos can be
costlessly stored, demand for borrowing would be unbounded and the bank’s problem would have
no solution.
When (13) holds, the bank’s optimal portfolio is still given by (8) and ¼¤ is still given by (6).




°t + (1 ¡ °t) Rt
1+r
: (14)
9 If there were a strong enough deflation, the central bank would earn negative revenue and need a way to finance
thispolicy. However, deflationwill not be an equilibrium outcomein thismodel regardlessofthe financemethodused.
16Themarket-clearingequationsarethesameasinSection3, andhence(9)and(10)continuetohold.
We proceed by adding the law of motion for this case to the phase diagram in figure 2: First, note
that in the region of the phase plane where °t+1 > (1 + r)°t holds, (13) is violated and the bank’s
problem has no solution. Therefore the equilibrium law of motion is not defined in this region.
For the remainder of the plane, we substitute (9) and (10) into the expression for ¼¤ in (6) and the


























The properties of this equation give us the following proposition.
10
Proposition 2 When the interest rate on discount window loans is fixed in real terms, there is a
unique equilibrium. This equilibrium is stationary, with °t = °¤ 2
h





The proof of Proposition 2 is presented in Appendix B. Notice that the unique equilibrium in this
case is identical to the stationary equilibrium discussed in Proposition 1. Hence fixing the real
interest rate ‘‘selects’’ the steady state by making it the unique equilibrium of the economy.
In the previous section, we saw that inflationary equilibria exist because, during an inflation,
the penalty that a bank pays when its reserves turn out to be too low falls to zero. In other words,
in the long run the discount window in that case is lending at exactly the market rate of interest.
10 This is a generalization of Proposition 4 in Antinolfi, Huybens, and Keister [2] , which covers the case of r equal
to zero. That paper handles the problem of deflation differently, by having the lender of last resort switch to a fixed
nominal rate policy so that feasibility is maintained. Because inflation is not an equilibrium outcome in either case,
both approaches yield the same result.
17With a fixed real interest rate on discount window loans, that does not happen. In this case, if there
were an inflation the real return on lending would fall to Ã, exactly as before. However, the real
rate on discount window loans remains fixed at (1 + r): Therefore, the real penalty faced by a
bank that goes to the discount window would increase over time. This generates a lower bound
on the demand for reserves (and hence for base money) that is absent in the previous case. To see
why, suppose that the economy were to follow an inflationary trajectory, where °t asymptotically
approaches zero. When ° has become very close to zero, ¼¤ and ¼¤¤ are very small. This implies
that in practically every period, the bank will be borrowing currency at a cost of (1 + r), while its
loans are earning a rate slightly above Ã < 1. Hence, regardless of the rate of return on money,
the bank would be better off holding more reserves and engaging in less lending, simply because
borrowing is so expensive. This means there is a lower bound on the demand for base money, even
as the rate of return to holding money goes to zero, and for this reason there cannot be a sustained
inflation. It is interesting to note that this policy is effective in eliminating inflationary equilibria
because it is always in line with the recommendation of Bagehot [3] that ‘‘in a crisis, the lender of
last resort should lend freely, at a penalty rate.’’
5. Implications for the Dollarization Debate
In this section, we discuss some interpretations of our analysis that we believe are relevant to the
currentdebateoverdollarizationinMexico. Webeginwithaclarifyingremark. Wehaveassumedin
thisanalysisthat thecentralbank’spolicy isfixedatthebeginningof timeandcannot bechangedin
responsetoobservedpricelevels. Thisisobviously nottrueforacentralbank’sannouncedpolicies.
If an inflation were to start, the central bank is free to change the interest rate that it charges at the
18discount window in response to this. Hence the policies in our model are best thought of as implicit
policies (or policy rules) that include the central bank’s reactions to possible future contingencies.
An example of this is discussed at the beginning of the previous section; the interest rate could be
posted in nominal terms but the central bank could follow a rule that adjusts the rate in each period
in such a way that the real rate remains constant. Alternatively, the central bank may announce
that the real interest rate will be kept constant but may, under some circumstances, be forced to
abandon this policy and switch to a fixed nominal rate. The key assumption in our analysis is that
the implicit policies or rules are correctly perceived by private agents, that is, that consumers and
banks have rational expectations.
The results in the previous two sections indicate that the banking systemshould face a fixed real
interest rate on short-term credit and not a fixed nominal rate, because the former policy contains
ananti-inflationary mechanismthatthelatter lacks. Whentherealinterestrateondiscountwindow
loansisfixed, thesizeof thepenalty facedby abankwhosereservesturnouttobetoolowincreases
during an inflation. This gives banks a strong incentive to hold cash reserves, which increases the
demand for money, which in turn implies that the inflation is inconsistent with market clearing.
In contrast, when the interest rate at the discount window is fixed in nominal terms, the penalty
faced by banks with insufficient reserves decreases during an inflation. This gradually erodes the
demand for reserves, and hence the demand for money. As a result, inflationary beliefs can be
self-fulfilling.
Why, then, would a central bank ever fix (either explicitly or implicitly) the nominal interest
rate on short-term credit? There are many potential answers to this question, but we conjecture
that most (if not all) of them would fall under the heading of ‘‘political pressure,’’ or an inability
19to commit to the desired policy. In a situation where the currency starts to lose its value, as in the
inflationary equilibria in our model, short-term credit serves two purposes: (i) by allowing banks
to transfer resources to those in need of liquidity, it spreads the burden of the inflation more evenly
(and thereby increases ex ante welfare) and (ii) it allows banks to hold fewer cash reserves and
thereby pay a lower inflation tax (on average). To maintain a constant real interest rate on these
loans, thecentral bankmust increasethenominal rateinsuchaway thatthepenalty –thedifference
betweenthediscountwindowrateandthemarketrate–increases. Thatis,inaperiodwherelenders
are becoming worse off and are most in need of a discount window, the central bank must increase
the cost of using the window. Political pressure may make it very difficult for the central bank to
maintainthispolicy.
11 Ifthecentralbankbowstopressureanddecreasesthepenalty, itiseffectively
fixing the nominal rate and inflation becomes an equilibrium outcome. The irony in this is that if
the central bank could commit to raising the penalty in this situation, the situation would not arise
in the first place.
How, then, could a central bank commit to a fixed real rate on short-term credit? If the in-
stitutional framework fails to isolate the central bank from current political pressure, this may be
difficult to do as long as the bank is capable of decreasing the penalty rate during an inflation. The
bank is able to do this as long as it is free to print money. Hence, we see dollarization (giving up
the ability to print money) as a mechanism for committing to a fixed real interest rate on short-term
creditby forcingthiscredittocomeat acost that isdeterminedoutsidetheeconomy. Intermsof the
model, we see Mexico as potentially falling in an inflationary equilibrium under a fixed nominal
11 Ifthe central bank is completely free ofcurrent political concerns, this is not an issue. Of course, more independent
central banks tend to have better records on inflation (see, for example, Alesina [1] and the references therein), so
that if the central bank were completely free of political concerns there may be no need to consider dollarization in the
first place.
20interest rate. Dollarization would entail a move to a fixed real interest rate, where the economy can
only be in the stationary equilibrium. This is the benefit of dollarization as captured in the model:
the elimination of inflation as an equilibrium outcome.
Concerning the costs of dollarizing, the lossof revenue fromliquidity lending is an obvious cost
that is captured in the model. At a somewhat deeper level, some authors have expressed concern
thata potential for financial instability wouldarise becauseaunilateral dollarizationentailstheloss
of the ability to make the currency elastic, or the ability to provide lender-of-last-resort services.
Eichengreen [7] , for example, writes that ‘‘The banking system must first be strengthened, so that
the authorities’ more limited capacity to provide lender-of-last-resort services does not expose the
country to financial instability.’’ There is undoubtedly reason for concern here, but our analysis
above points out two reasons why this problem may not be as severe as it at first seems. The first
point is that liquidity crises should occur less frequently in a dollarized economy. In terms of the
model, inaninflationary equilibrium°t islowandasa result ¼¤ islow(see(11)). Thereforeshocks
large enough to lead to a crisis will occur relatively often. In contrast, in the dollarized (stationary)
equilibrium °t and ¼¤ are higher, so that larger shocks will be required to induce a crisis. In other
words, dollarizationleadsthebankingsystemtoholdliquidity forinsurancepurposes,whichmakes
the occurrence of liquidity crises less likely. The second point is that even when a crisis does occur,
it is not the case that a dollarized economy has no way of obtaining liquidity or providing lender-
of-last-resort services. As Calvo [5] points out, ‘‘in advanced countries the lender of last resort
does not issue money to finance the operation, it issues bonds, public debt.’’ This can also be
done in a dollarized economy. In the model, this corresponds to the central bank being forced to
borrowandhencelendat somefixedrealrate. Theseverity of criseswillclearly dependonthisrate
21(which will in turn depend on international markets), but by no means would they be as severe as
if there were no liquidity available (r = 1). Hence a combination of changing bank behavior and
public borrowing in international markets may lead to a more stable banking environment under
dollarization.
We conclude by mentioning briefly an important issue that we have considered only implicitly
in our discussion. Institutional arrangements aimed at providing a dollarized economy with an
elastic currency in times of high liquidity demand (which can also be thought of as lender-of-last-
resort services) would most likely rely on some form of public borrowing. This is important in our
reasoning above, and implies that under dollarization monetary issues would become more closely
tied to fiscal policy. For this reason it may be important to look at fiscal discipline as a crucial
element of a successful dollarization program. We leave the integration of this issue into a formal
banking model for future research.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Equation (12) defines °t+1 as an implicit function of °t over some range. Where this function



















Taking the limit as °t+1 goes to zero in (12) shows °t must also go to zero and hence the implicit









22Therefore the law of motion starts out below the 45-degree line. This and continuity of the im-
plicit function imply that initial values for ° that are low enough will generate equilibria where °t
converges to zero and hence there is inflation. Clearly there is a continuum of such values.
Taking the limit as °t+1 goes to one in (12) shows that °t approaches a value less than one, and
therefore the law of motion eventually lies above the 45-degree line. By continuity, there exists at












so that we have
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F (¼)d¼ · ¼
¤¤;
which implies that we have
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These bounds on °¤ are precisely those stated in the proposition. Using the fact that r is positive, it
can be shown that the slope of the law of motion at any steady state must be greater than one, and
therefore the steady state is unique.
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
When °t+1 > (1 + r)°t, we know that the law of motion is not defined. Elsewhere, the slope of














The implicit function is defined and continuous in a neighborhood of any point where the denomi-
nator of this expression is non-zero, that is, where °t+1 is non-zero. Such critical points are given











F (¼)d¼ ´ g(°): (17)




















































so that for positive values of °; the function g is strictly increasing and strictly concave. We also
have
lim






This implies that there is a unique solution to (17), which we denote by °: For values of ° below °,
we have ° < g(°) and therefore there does not exist a value of °t+1 satisfying (15). In this region
the law of motion is not defined. For values of ° above °; we have g0 (°) < 1; which implies
that the slope of the law of motion is positive. Hence, whenever the law of motion is defined, it is













24which is exactly the same equation that defines steady states when r is fixed in nominal terms. By









This analysis demonstrates that the law of motion looks like the curve in figure 2. Any trajectory
with °t+1 < °t for some t will pass below ° and thereby leave the feasible region in finite time.
Such a trajectory cannot be an equilibrium. As°t approaches 1¡
Ã
(1+r); the value of °t+1 satisfying
(12) approaches (1 + r)°t, which is an edge of the feasible region. This implies that any trajectory
with °t+1 > °t for some t will also leave the feasible region in finite time and therefore cannot
be an equilibrium. These last two observations together imply that the steady state is the unique
equilibrium of this economy.
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